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I. INTRODUCTION
A grand jury in Georgia returned a six-count indictment against
three individuals, charging each with aggravated assault and simple bat-
tery. The defendants were white, while the victim was black. Shortly
thereafter, leaders of the African-American community circulated leaflets
urging the town's residents to boycott the defendants' place of business.
Because of the community reaction to the allegedly racially motivated
assaults, the prosecution, in pre-trial proceedings, moved to forbid the
use of race-based peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors.
Under Georgia law, forty-two people comprise the typical petit jury
venire.' Because the racial composition of the community was forty-
three percent African-American, in all probability, the twenty peremptory
challenges allowed to the defendants 2 would have been more than enough
to exclude all potential black jurors.'
The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that no such pro-
hibition restricting the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal
defendant existed. 4 The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision, reasoning that jury trials are an essential element in .the pro-
tection of human rights; therefore, the court would not restrict the free
exercise of peremptory challenges by the criminal defendant.,
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the United States Constitution prohibits the race-based exercise of per-
emptory challenges by criminal defendants.6 Five members7 joined in the
majority opinion that held: 1) the state had standing to raise objections
on behalf of the excluded jurors; 2) the accused's exercise of these
challenges was considered state action to invoke constitutional scrutiny;
and 3) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors
from jury service solely on the basis of race.' The Court reversed the
1. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-160 (1990).
2. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-12-165 (1990). In Georgia, a defendant who is indicted for
an offense which carries a penalty of four years or greater is allowed to exercise twenty
peremptory challenges against the jurors impaneled to hear the controversy.
3. Assuming the petit jury venire accurately reflected the community's racial com-
position, 19 (4301o x 42 = 18.06) prospective black jurors would likely have been called
for possible jury service.
4. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992).
5. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (1991).
6. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991).
7. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas penned two concurrences joining
with the majority in the judgment. Justices O'Connor and Scalia each dissented as to
the judgment.
8. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348.
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judgment of Georgia's high court and remanded the case to the original
forum for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 9
The United States Supreme Court faced these issues in Georgia v.
McCollum, 10 the latest case in a recent line of Supreme Court decisions
restricting the exercise of racially-based peremptory challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." However, this
decision extends the scope of equal protection review and affords pro-
tection to potential jury members challenged by criminal defendants.
The irony is that, for the Equal Protection Clause to have any appli-
cation, the defendant must be considered a state actor.1 2
McCollum was strike three for racially-based exclusions from jury
service. This note focuses on the impact of McCollum on the future
exercise of peremptory exclusions in today's judicial process. Section I
provides a history of peremptory challenges and of the jury system itself;
this section also incorporates a brief study of prior jurisprudence limiting
race-based exclusions of potential jurors. Section II addresses the test
for Equal Protection Clause litigation and the requirement of state action.
The analysis then focuses on possible alternatives to the current Supreme
Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause. Section III highlights
the possible extension of this analysis to other types of discriminatory
exclusions such as those based on gender. Finally, Part IV questions
whether any substance remains in the peremptory challenge and the
future viability of this practice after the judgment in McCollum.
II. HISTORY OF THE JURY AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Jury
The jury system has its origins in early Roman law. 3 The first
evidence of this principle in the Anglo-Saxon tradition immigrated to
England in 1166 A.D. with the Assize of Clarendon which allowed
9. Id. at 2359.
10. Id. at 2348.
11. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Powers v. Ohio,
111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); and
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824 (1965). These cases are discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 26-53.
12. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55.
13. It was employed by the Romans in criminal cases, and the Lex Servilia (B.C.
104) allowed for the accuser and the accused to submit a list of impartial judices from
which each would strike fifty members of the two hundred member pool of prospective
jurors to allow one hundred men to hear the controversy. Batson, 476 U.S. at 120, 106
S. Ct. at 1735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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inquiry into robbery and murder by "the twelve most lawful men." 1 4
Later, in England, the members of the jury were chosen based upon
their knowledge of the events at issue. This privilege gradually evolved
into today's concept of selecting those members of the pool of jurors
who know nothing of the instant litigation so as to assure an impartial
trial. 5 The protection afforded by a jury immigrated with the American
colonists from England, and the forefathers considered it such an es-
sential right that they included the jury system as a constitutional safe-
guard in the Sixth 6 and Seventh 7 amendments of the Bill of Rights of
the United States Constitution.
In order to implement these constitutional safeguards, a fair pro-
cedure for selecting a jury is necessary. The method employed today
begins with the state drawing names "indiscriminately and by lot in
open court"; subsequently the state summons those chosen to appear
before the court.' s At this time, the trial judge and the parties' counsel
have the opportunity to examine each potential juror to decide whether
that person should be accepted for jury duty. Attorneys use this ex-
amination (known as voir dire) "to ferret out conscious or subconscious
preconceptions and biases which may impact the selection of a fair and
impartial jury.'" 9
14. The "Assize of Clarendon" is comprised of a series of ordinances promulgated
by an assembly of lords during the reign of King Henry II of England to improve the
procedures utilized in the criminal law and to institute the grand jury system. 3 Encyclopedia
Britannica 348 (1985). See also S. Alexandria Jo, Reconstruction of the Peremptory
Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 22 Pac. L.J. 1305
(1991); Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority 228 (1986).
15. Damaska, supra note 14, at 40.
16. The safeguard afforded by the Sixth Amendment refers only to a criminal pro-
ceeding. It provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained
by the law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
(emphasis added).
17. The Seventh Amendment provides the requirement for jury trials in certain civil
proceedings. It reads:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
(emphasis added).
18. La. Code Crim. P. art. 784.
19. Louisiana Standards on Jury Use and Management No. 7, 15 (Final Draft 1989).
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After the voir dire examination, the parties may strike a potential
juror from the panel for cause 20 or exercise a peremptory challenge. A
strike for cause occurs when the presiding judge determines that a
potential juror will be unable to consider an issue to be contested at
trial "fairly and impartially." ' 2' A peremptory challenge, on the other
hand, involves the right to challenge a potential juror "without assigning,
or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." ' 22 Counsel
normally bases a challenge for cause upon prejudicial information ob-
tained during voir dire that exhibits a possible predisposition of a juror
toward a given outcome; thus, the peremptory challenge can be premised
on inarticulable "hunches" or a "seat-of-the-pants" judgment, or even
no reason at all. 23 This note focuses upon the latter of these two types
of challenges and the validity of this random and indiscriminate decision-
making.
B. Applicable Jurisprudence
The United States Constitution has been interpreted to afford rem-
edies for any illicit discrimination by persons considered state actors.
Evidence of the judiciary's remedial powers granted by the Constitution
are found in cases that address the race-based exercise of peremptory
challenges and charge that such action violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The intention of the drafters of
the Civil War Amendments-which included the Fourteenth-was to
accomplish a constitutionalization of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.24
Thus, the primary intention of the drafters of these amendments was
to guarantee equal treatment between whites and the newly freed slaves. 21
20. La. Code Crim. P. art. 797. A challenge for cause may be exercised in criminal
trials for one of five reasons. They are: 1) lack of qualification, 2) partiality, 3) special
relationship between the juror and parties in the case, 4) juror will not accept the law
as given to him by the court, and 5) juror previously served on the indicting grand jury,
or another petit jury that has tried the defendant for the same or another offense.
21. This concept was taken from Standard 8 of the Standards on Juror Use and
Management issued by the American Bar Association in effect in 1989. It reads as follows:
If the judge determines during the voir dire process that any individual is unable
or unwilling to hear the particular case at issue fairly and impartially, that
individual should be removed from the panel. Such a determination may be
made on motion of counsel or on the judge's own initiative.
Louisiana Standards on Jury Use and Management No. 7 (Final Draft 1989) (citing ABA
Standards on Juror Use and Management).
22. Black's Law Dictionary 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
23. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21, 85 S. Ct. 824, 836 (1965).
24. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 18 (1977). See also William Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From
Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine (1988); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986).
25. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 306 (1880).
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Courts soon applied this guarantee to the process of jury selection.
1. Strauder v. West Virginia-The Seminal Race-Based Exclusion
Jurisprudence
The Court did not address the issue of racial discrimination in jury
selection until 1880. In Strauder v. West Virginia,2 6 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the exclusion of non-whites, not from the jury,
but from the jury venire. 27 In Strauder, an all-white jury convicted a
black man of murder. The state of West Virginia statutorily limited
persons eligible for jury service to white male citizens of that state who
were at least twenty-one years old. Thus, the issue before the Court
was whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state's unilateral
exclusion from jury service of all non-whites, regardless of their capacity
or availability to serve.
The Strauder Court recognized that although a defendant has no
right to "a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his
own race," he does have a right to be tried by a jury whose members
are selected in a nondiscriminatory manner. 21 In the view of the Court,
the selection of jurors in a racially discriminatory manner not only
harmed the defendant, but also injured the eliminated prospective jurors.
2. Swain v. Alabama-The "Systematic Exclusion" Standard
The Court did not consider the race-based exercise of peremptory
challenges until almost 100 years after the Strauder decision. This case,
Swain v. Alabama,2 9 posed the issue of the constitutionality of race-
based peremptory exclusions by a state prosecutor in a criminal case.
The defendant in this case accused the prosecution of excluding members
of the defendant's race from jury service on the basis of skin color.
In the trial court, the jury convicted the defendant, and the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court also af-
firmed, finding no constitutional infirmity.
The Court rejected the defendant's equal protection claim, holding
that to make such a case, the defendant had the burden of proving the
prosecution's systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury over
many different cases. In this instance, the defendant had not met this
burden of proof and was unable to show purposeful discrimination over
26. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
27. The Court decided this issue to determine the propriety of federal jurisdiction.
28. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
29. 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824 (1965).
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a period of time.3 0 Thus, although the Court frowned upon the exercise
of racially-tainted peremptory challenges, it believed that a pattern of
discrimination was required before it could contravene the exercise of
peremptory challenges.3
3. Batson v. Kentucky-Race-Based Exercise of Peremptory
Challenges are Unconstitutional in the Criminal Arena
In 1986, the Court had the opportunity to reconsider and overrule
Swain in Batson v. Kentucky.3 2 Here, the Court ruled that the exercise
of peremptory challenges by the prosecution to eliminate potential jurors
solely on account of their race violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the "Constitution prohibits all forms of purposeful racial dis-
crimination in the selection of jurors."33 Contrary to the ruling in Swain,
the Batson Court held that the equal protection challenge may be sus-
tained on the showing of a pattern of race-based exclusions in a single
case, thereby abrogating the requirement in Swain of a demonstration
of a historical pattern of discrimination.
. In its decision, the Court outlined a three-pronged test to evaluate
a defendant's equal protection challenge. First, to bring a successful
challenge, the defendant, who must be a member of a cognizable racial
group, must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution's exercise
of peremptory challenges was tainted with racially-based motives.3 4 Sec-
ond, once the defense has made this showing, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
challenge. Finally, the trial court must decide whether the state's artic-
ulated explanation overcomes the defendant's prima facie presentation.
If the defense does prove discriminatory intent, the trial court has great
discretion with which to grant a remedy.35 These provisions enunciated
30. Id. at 224, 85 S. Ct. at 838. The Swain test was almost an impossible burden
for the defendant to meet. In the days before written records of voir dire, a defendant
had no chance of proving this "systematic exclusion." American courts only decided three
cases in favor of a defendant under the Swain rule. In light of Louisiana's discriminatory
history, it is not surprising that all of these cases originated in this state. See, e.g., United
States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d
751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
31. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227-28, 85 S. Ct. at 839-40.
32. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
33. Id. at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1718.
34. The defendant makes a prima fade showing by exhibiting that the facts sur-
rounding the jury selection process evidence a racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges on the part of the prosecution. Id. at 93-94, 106 S. Ct. at 1721.
35. Id. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-24.
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by the Court were far from clear and provided little guidance to trial
courts concerning the remedy to be afforded the defendant in such
circumstances 36
4. Powers v. Ohio-Vehicle Allowing Third-Party Standing
Five years later, the Court in Powers v. Ohio3 7 extended its decision
in Batson by declaring that the defendant need not be a member of a
minority to maintain a successful equal protection challenge as required
in previous cases. Powers was also the first case to hold that a criminal
defendant has standing to raise an equal protection challenge on behalf
of the excluded juror.31
In Powers, the defendant was a white man accused of aggravated
murder and other related offenses. During the voir dire examination,
the prosecution exercised seven of ten allotted peremptory challenges to
remove black potential jurors. The defendant, Powers, objected after
each exercise of the peremptory challenge on the basis of the Court's
previous ruling in Batson, but the trial court overruled these objections,
and the impaneled jury convicted the defendant. Powers appealed his
conviction to the Ohio Court of Appeals, claiming that the allegedly
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the validity of an
equal protection claim of a white defendant who objects to the exclusion
of a black potential juror. The Court upheld the equal protection ob-
jection and reversed the conviction, remanding the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. 9 By doing so, the Court granted to the defen-
dant the necessary third party standing to raise the objection for the
excluded potential juror.
For the doctrine of third party standing to have effect in this equal
protection violation, the Court required three factors: 1) concrete interest
in the disposition of the claim; 2) the defendant's relation to the excluded
36. In Louisiana, the statutory remedies are either to seat the juror or take any other
action the court deems appropriate. La. Code Crim. P. art. 795(E). In addition, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has also declined to provide any guidance in this matter. See,
e.g., State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815 (La. 1989). The. Batson rationale prohibiting the
race-based exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution has been codified in
Louisiana law in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 795(C). Clifford R. Strider,
Current Legal Issues in Jury Selection, Louisiana District Attorneys Ass'n 18th Annual
Conference, August 1992.
37. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
38. This result was presaged by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692
(1975), in which a male defendant was permitted to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge
on behalf of a female who was denied the opportunity to serve on a jury. See Lee
Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980, 41 La. L.
Rev. 529, 530 n.5 (1981).
39. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1366-67.
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juror; and 3) difficulty or an impediment faced by the excluded juror
which may prevent him from prosecuting his claim. 40
The Court found that these requirements were met in Powers to
allow the prosecution to object on behalf of the excluded juror for the
impermissible actions of the prosecution. The first requirement mentioned
above was met, in the view of the Court, because the juror has an
interest in the elimination of any racial discrimination in criminal trials
which infects the integrity of the judicial system and casts doubt on
the objectivity and fairness of its functions. Because such action by the
prosecution harms the potential juror and prevents him from partici-
pating in the judicial process, the prosecution has inflicted a concrete
injury on the rights of the excluded juror .4
The state addressed the second prong of the third-party standing
question by showing that the defendant and the excluded juror have
the same goal, the elimination of racial discrimination from the judicial
process; therefore, the Court believed that these facts satisfied the second
requisite cited earlier. The potential jury member could be embarrassed
because such action occurs in a public forum. Also, the venireperson,
as well as the defendant, may lose confidence in the judicial system
because of such discrimination. Thus, the similarity between the interests
of the defendant and the potential juror allow the defendant standing
to prosecute the equal protection claim on behalf of the excluded juror.42
Finally, the defendant was deemed to be the proper party to bring
this question because it is highly unlikely that a juror excluded on
account of his race will protest and litigate his exclusion from a jury.
Little opportunity exists for the excluded juror to promote his views at
the time of the exclusion. Also, such a showing would be difficult for
an individual juror at voir dire because of the impossibility of showing
that this discrimination was likely to re-occur. Finally, in addition to
the other considerations, the economics of the situation do not justify
the expense of litigating such a suit by an excluded potential juror.43
After considering the factors and rationale discussed above, the Court
held that the defendant could address the. disparate treatment suffered
by the excluded juror and bring a claim on his behalf based upon the
Equal Protection Clause, regardless of race.
5. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc.-Extension of
Batson to the Civil Arena
The Court wasted little time in applying the third-party standing
decision in Powers to allow a civil litigant to object to his adversary's
40. Id. at 1370.
41. Id. at 1370-72.
42. Id. at 1372.
43. Id. at 1373.
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race-based exercise of a peremptory challenge. In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Company, Inc.," the Court extended its Batson rationale to
civil litigants exercising peremptory challenges. The Court reasoned that
"[riacial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the
proceeding is civil or criminal .... The Constitution demands nothing
less." 45
However, the major issue facing the Court in Edmonson was not
whether race-based peremptory challenges constituted impermissible racial
discrimination. 4 The Court had already answered this question in Batson.
Rather, the Court focused upon the discrimination that resulted from
the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority
and, if so, whether the party exercising the challenges could be considered
a state actor. The Batson Court had no need to address this issue
because of the rather self-evident relation between the action of the state
prosecutor, when acting in his official capacity, and the state; accord-
ingly, the actions of a state prosecutor are reasonably chargeable to the
state.
Rather, in Edmonson, the issue concerning the race-based exercise
of peremptory challenges took on a new dimension because both parties
involved were private litigants. The fact that the participants were civil
litigants posed a problem for the conventional Constitutional analysis.
Normally, private litigants were not previously believed to perform func-
tions fairly attributable to the state. In finding state action in Batson,
the Court is justified because the state at least employs the prosecutor
and grants him powers such as prosecuting arrested criminals and per-
forming sundry investigative activities that, in our society, only the state
possesses. Consequently, it seems much easier to find state action by
the prosecutor, rather than by a private litigant. However, a state action
determination is essential, for otherwise there would be no constitutional
violation.4 7
In Edmonson, the Court found such state action on the part of the
private litigants by considering three factors: 1) the extent to which the
litigant received the "overt, significant assistance of the court," 2)
whether the action constituted a "traditional function of state govern-
ment," and 3) whether government acquiescence in the courtroom uniquely
44. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
45. Id. at 2088.
46. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
47. This principle is inherent in the Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer: "[T]he
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as
may be fairly said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct.
836, 842 (1948). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct.
856 (1961); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S, 345, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
1732 [Vol. 53
NOTES
aggravated the alleged discrimination. 4 Through the application of the
enunciated principles, the Edmonson Court found that the civil litigants
satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of state action.
Finally, in light of its decision in Powers two months earlier, the
Court held that a private litigant may raise the question of equal
protection on behalf of an excluded potential juror. The Court based
its reasoning on the premise that there was no reason to limit third-
party standing to the criminal courtroom. Therefore, the decision in
Powers cleared the obstacles that prevented the extension of Equal
Protection rights to potential jurors impaneled in criminal, as well as
civil trials, rather than limiting such claims to the adversarial participants
themselves. Only through Powers could the Court extend the holding
in Batson to apply to litigants outside the criminal arena.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor
in dissent. O'Connor compared the "state action" in Edmonson to that
found in previous decisions of the Supreme Court.4 9 These justices
believed that precedent required more actual state involvement than
simply a juror being advised by the judge of his dismissal. In this regard
the dissent remarked that mere "[j]udicial acquiescence does not convert
private choice into that of the state." 50 Thus, in light of these prior
decisions, the actions of the private defendants in McCollum do not
require the constitutional liability that attaches to "wrongdoers 'who
carry a badge of authority of [the government] and represent it in some
capacity."''
Justice Scalia also penned a separate dissent in which he presaged
the application of the Batson doctrine concerning the elimination of the
race-based exercise of peremptory challenges to the criminal defendant.52
He also pointed to the added complexity of the judicial process caused
by the decision in Edmonson and its effect on the administration of
justice. 3 Such extra "fringe" claims add to the backlog in the American
48. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2083-87.
49. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836; Jackson, 419 U.S. 345, 358 S. Ct. 449;
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982).
50. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2091.
51. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S. Ct.
454, 461 (1988) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S. Ct. 473, 476 (1961)).
52. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2095.
53. In his dissent, Justice Scalia states:
Thus, yet another complexity is added to an increasingly Byzantine system of
justice that devotes more and more of its energy to sideshows and less and less
to the merits of the case. Judging by the number of Batson claims that have
made their way even as far as this Court under the pre-Powers regime, it is a
certainty that the amount of judges' and lawyers' time devoted to implementing
today's newly discovered Law of the Land will be enormous. That time will
be diverted from other matters, and the overall system of justice will certainly
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judicial system and divert needed resources to collateral issues, adding
to the already crowded docket. Thus, according to Scalia, Edmonson
had the effect of stalling justice for litigants, in spite of the Court's
enunciated purpose.
III. Ti EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION IN
GEORGA V. McCoLLuM
When considering the Equal Protection Clause and its interpretation,
one must begin with the actual text. The mandate seems straightforward
and self-explanatory: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." '5 4 However, the interpre-
tation of this simple clause has proven to be problematic and complex.
After a brief recitation of the facts and issues involved in McCollum,
the analysis in this section will examine the function of jury selection
envisioned by the Court, viewed from the standpoint of the individual
parties involved in the litigation. The second segment will examine
seemingly inconsistent interpretations of the state action requirement in
the United States Constitution.
A. Analysis
Georgia v. McCollum followed inevitably from the decision in Ed-
monson. Justice Scalia's dissent in Edmonson foreshadowed McCollum's
result:
Batson v. Kentucky already prevents the prosecution from using
race-based strikes. The effect of today's decision (which logically
must apply to criminal prosecutions) will be to prevent the
defendant from doing so-so that the minority defendant can
no longer seek to prevent an all-white jury, or to seat as many
jurors of his own race as possible."5
True to Justice Scalia's warning, the Court faced this issue which the
Batson Court "specifically reserved" for consideration at a later date.
6
suffer.
Id. at 2096. Because Edmonson was decided only one year ago, little evidence exists as
to whether Justice Scalia's warning will come to fruition.
54. United States Const., amend. XIV (1868).
55. Edmonson, IlI S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
56. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 n.12 (1986).
Chief Justice Burger, one of the two dissents in Batson, believed that the decision implicitly
resolved the issue in McCollum. He reasoned:
But the clear and inescapable import of this novel holding [Batson] will inevitably
be to limit the use of this valuable tool to both prosecutors and defense attorneys
alike. Once the Court has held that prosecutors are limited in their use of
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In McCollum, a white criminal defendant allegedly exercised his
allotted peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury panel
during voir dire. The Court had no choice but to find a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause in McCollum unless it overruled Edmon-
son.57 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun stated that the Court
faced three issues: 1) whether the defendant's racially discriminatory
exercise of peremptories inflicted the harms contemplated in Batson, 2)
whether the actions on the part of the accused constituted state action
for constitutional purposes, and 3) whether the state had standing to
raise the equal protection challenges.58
The Court easily resolved the first issue by declining to differentiate
between the harms inflicted in the Batson exclusions and those involved
in the instant litigation. The "multiple ends" of Batson-to remedy
"the harm done to the 'dignity of persons' and to the 'integrity of the
courts"'-were no less apparent in the defense context than those ex-
ercised by the prosecution. 9 The majority declared that when "the juror
is subjected to open and public racial discrimination ... the harm from
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the de-
fendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community."60
The decision in Powers eliminated the need for consideration of the
third issue-standing. In McCollum, the Court applied the third-party
standing criteria announced in Powers to determine whether the pros-
ecution could raise a constitutional objection on behalf of the excluded
potential jurors. This three-pronged test required a concrete injury to
the litigant, a close relation of prosecution to the third party, and the
existence of a hindrance to the third party prosecuting his claim.6'
Through the application of these precepts, the Court ruled that the
prosecution had satisfied the requirements and, therefore, could raise
the issue.62
peremptory challenges, could we rationally hold that defendants are not? "Our
criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the
accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and
the state the scales are to be evenly held."'
476 U.S. at 126, 106 S. Ct. at 1738 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U.S. 68, 70, 7 S. Ct. 350, 351 (1887)) (footnote omitted).
57. This statement seems rather self-evident because the author, Justice Blackmun,
often referred to Edmonson, decided in the previous term. In McCollum, the Court used
the same analytical framework as it did in Edmonson, thus predicating the decision on
the same factors as used previously. If the decision in McCollum differed from Edmonson
when using the same rationale, it would contradict the latter case, and thus require
reversal.
58. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992).
59. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991)).
60. Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87).
61. Id. at 2357 (citing Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-71).
62. Id. In regards to the first prong of the standing test, the Court referred to the
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The only issue that gave the Court pause in McCollum involved the
alleged state action on the part of the dismissing criminal defendant. It
is that issue which poses difficulty to the application of a traditional
equal protection analysis. Traditionally, state action is defined as "any
agency whereby the state exercised its powers.' '63 In early Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the concept of state action referred to that conduct ex-
ercised in place of the state. 64 More recently, however, in Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co.,61 the Rehnquist Court has backed away from findings
of state action, determining that state action is any activity that con-
stitutes a traditional function of government. Thus, the decision in
Edmonson is in stark contrast to recent constitutional jurisprudence and
stretches the principle of state action beyond traditional limits when it
finds state action on the part of private civil litigants. The Court in
McCollum expanded the notion of state action to the logical extension
of this line of constitutional jurisprudence-race-based exercise o.f per-
emptory challenges by the criminal defendant is state action. 66
The Edmonson Court based its finding of state action by civil
litigants on four grounds: 1) the race-based exclusion occurs in a court-
house, 2) the peremptory challenge may only be exercised within the
context of a jury trial, 3) this peremptory challenge is a statutory privilege
granted by the state, and 4) the excluded jurors themselves may have
rights to be selected in a non-discriminatory manner under the Equal
Protection Clause. However, the following discussion will attempt to
reveal some defects in this reasoning in the context of McCollum.
B. The Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge from the Viewpoint of
the Individual Participants
This section will examine the jury selection process and the exercise
of the peremptory challenge as a function of that process viewed from
the position of the different participants in a criminal trial. When
considering the "players," the logical beginning is to examine the sit-
uation of the person with the most to lose-the defendant. Secondly,
damage to the court's integrity and perception of fairness inflicted by the criminal de-
fendant's discrimination. Answering the second question, the Court said that "the State
is the logical and proper party to assert" the claims of the excluded jurors in a criminal
proceeding. Id. The final requisite is satisfied by the "daunting" barriers to suit faced
by the excluded jurors. Id. (quoting Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373). Therefore, because of
an analysis of these factors, the Court found that the prosecution was the proper party
to assert the excluded jurors' constitutional rights.
63. Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 518 (Harold W.
Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 1978).
64. Id. See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946).
65. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
66. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
1736 [Vol. 53
NO TES
this section focuses on the plight of the peremptorily-excused juror.
Next, the role of the prosecution as an embodiment of the state must
be addressed. Lastly, the state in its abstract form must be studied to
evaluate its balancing of the need for justice and equitable determinations
in the scope of a criminal proceeding and the desire to eliminate illicit
discrimination at every juncture in today's society. One must break the
criminal proceeding into its component parts to fully understand the
competing interests involved in jury selection.
1. The Criminal Defendant
The defendant occupies a unique position in the criminal trial that
is comparable to few situations in today's society. In this situation, the
person accused of a felony has his property (i.e., a monetary fine),
liberty (i.e., a sentence in prison), and perhaps even his life at stake.
This situation is realized by no other litigant in the American judicial
system. Normally, in a civil case, the most a person stands to forfeit
is property or a large sum of money. However, most would agree that
even the possibility of civil injunction or the contractual remedy of
specific performance is not as severe as even the possibility of con-
finement in the state or federal penitentiary. For this reason, the United
States Constitution affords greater protections to the criminal defendant
than the civil litigant.67
In Batson, the Court stated that "[o]ur criminal justice system
'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also
from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state
the scales are to be evenly held."' 6 However, the scales of our system
of justice are hardly evenly balanced. In our system, the criminal de-
fendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. A crime must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by only a preponderance
of the evidence as required in the civil counterpart. Finally, before trial,
the prosecution is required to furnish the defense with evidence that is
favorable to the defendant. 69 Thus, if the subconscious reasoning sur-
rounding the decision in McCollum is based upon the equities of a
criminal proceeding, this reliance is misplaced.
The social perception of a lone defendant versus "the full force of
society" simply does not overcome these other safeguards afforded to
a criminal defendant. In light of the constitutional safeguards and other
concessions previously mentioned, if the peremptory challenge system
67. Compare Amendments V, VI, and VIII (governing criminal issues) and Amendment
VII (governing civil litigation).
68. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1729 (1986) (quoting
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70, 7 S. Ct. 350, 353 (1887) (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., La. Code Crim. P. arts. 716-722.
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continues to function as it is presently operated, the Court could rea-
sonably allow the criminal defendant's unfettered exercise of peremptory
challenges, while limiting the prosecutor's use of that challenge in order
to actually balance the criminal justice system. Justice White, writing
for the majority in Swain v. Alabama (the first case to call into question
the race-based exercise of peremptory challenges) stated that "the chal-
lenge is 'one of the most important of the rights secured to the ac-
cused."' 70 Thus, the judicial system may prefer the unfettered exercise
of the peremptory challenge by all parties involved, rather than requiring
the "overhaul" of the doctrine of state action spoken of by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Edmonson.7 1
2. The Excluded Juror
The jury performs an essential truth-finding function inherent in a
criminal trial. While the trial by jury is guaranteed as a protection to
the accused,72 the right to serve on a petit jury is not expressly granted
to a person in the United States. However, in McCollum, the Court
seems to suggest that the opportunity to serve on a jury rises to a
fundamental right secured under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Fundamental rights are those rights that are either expressly granted
or implied by the Constitution. 73 The Court has previously determined
that voting, while not a constitutional right, is a fundamental right for
equal protection purposes. 74 It appears that some Court decisions also
find education to be such a protected right 5. 7 These are only two of a
myriad of rights held by the Court to be fundamental.7 6
70. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S. Ct. 824, 835 (1965) (quoting Pointer
v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408, 14 S. Ct. 410, 414 (1894)).
71. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
72. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
73. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice O'Connor
remarked, "Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805
(1992). Thus, this is evidence that the rights need not be expressly listed in order to be
considered fundamental.
74. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966).
75. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982); Brown v. Board of Educ.
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
45 S. Ct. 571 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923). However,
see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973),
which states that there is no right to equality in public education. Although there is no
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The treatment of the two rights mentioned, voting and education,
can be reconciled on the premise that, although neither are expressly
granted by the Constitution, both are preservative of other rights so
protected and, thus, qualify for examination as fundamental rights. 77
Education protects by informing all students, whether in elementary,
secondary, or higher education, about the democratic freedoms each
student enjoys, their values, and how to obtain them. Voting allows
one to voice his concern about governmental affairs and protect his way
of life by voicing his protest in the form of the ballot. In this way,
voting and education can be considered protective of the rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution.
The right to be a member of a jury bears a close resemblance to
those rights listed above and also may be couched in terms of a privilege
that preserves those rights expressly granted by the Constitution. The
public's participation in the judicial process by means of the jury system
helps to eliminate the possible mistrust inherent in today's legal system
and to instill the citizens' confidence in the truth-finding role of the
judicial system. Thus, the non-discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges could be an avenue by which the Court protects the "right"
to be selected for jury service in a non-discriminatory manner. However,
nowhere in the opinion was the action contested in McCollum subjected
to the strict scrutiny that accompanies a determination of an issue as
a fundamental right. Although McCollum seems to implicitly recognize
jury service as such a fundamental right, the Court stops short of an
outright declaration. Therefore, because the majority simply speaks in
the ambiguous terms of protecting the integrity of the courtroom and
does not examine the issue with its usual strict rigor, the Court must
not have classified service on a jury as a fundamental right.
In Batson and its progeny, the Court places an immense emphasis
on the plight of the excused juror. As mentioned previously, after
Powers, the state (acting through the prosecutor) had the authority to
raise the alleged discrimination on behalf of the excused juror. Thus,
the doctrine of third party standing has taken the forefront in the
prohibition of discrimination in the courtroom, although sometimes it
has been at the expense of the defendant.
When examined for jury duty, the venireperson only answers the
questions asked by the examining attorney. Other than this simple duty,
a venireperson has no other function before actually being impaneled
fundamental right to "equal education," Rodriquez may not eliminate the possibility of
a fundamental right to education generally granted by prior jurisprudence.
76. These rights range from the express right to free speech and the free exercise of
religion (United States Const., amend. I) to the right to choose (Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
77. See supra notes 74 and 75.
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and, consequently, knows little of the activities surrounding the jury
selection process. The attorney may choose to peremptorily strike the
potential juror. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure requires that
a peremptory challenge be "communicated to the court in a side bar
conference of the judge" and the "attorneys conducting the examina-
tion. '"7 This conference is conducted in a confidential manner, and only
the court and the examining attorneys know of the challenges until the
court announces the disqualification. 79 If these challenges are conducted
properly, the juror never knows of the reason, whether it be race-based
or race-neutral. Where is the harm normally required for third party
standing? The Court's answer that the defendant's action 'casts doubt
on the integrity of the judicial process".' 80 is not sufficient. How can
this action "cast doubt" when the excluded potential juror never knows
of the reason for the dismissal?
The remedy of the alleged discrimination poses an even larger prob-
lem. After Batson, the Court did not provide a remedy and left the
decision to the discretion of the trial judge. Two possible situations are
illustrated by the following hypothetical situations: Does the court ask
the dismissed black potential jurors to remain in another location, while
allowing excluded white venirepersons to leave so as to have the former
prepared for impaneling in the event that the court determines that a
race-based exercise of peremptory challenges did occur? Or does the
judge simply declare a mistrial at the showing of discriminatory intent,
thereby causing years of delay in an already congested criminal docket?
In both cases, these seemingly impractical "remedies" seem to perpetuate
the recognition of the arbitrary differences between the races no less
than the exercise of race-based exclusions from jury service condemned
in McCollum and its predecessors."' As a matter of fact, such separation
by race may even constitute another form of harassment.8 2 Although a
noble cause, the Court evidenced a lack of thought about the ramifi-
cations of the remedies involved. Trial courts, by implementing the
"remedies" discussed previously, realistically do little to enhance the
position of the excluded juror. In this "no-win" situation, the Court's
decision in McCollum to enter a contrived analysis of the doctrine of
state action does not further justice or civil rights.
3. The State Prosecutor
In the end, the state prosecutor stands to gain the most from the
Court's decision in McCollum. The criminal defendant certainly does
78. La. Code Crim. P. art. 795(B)(2).
79. Id.
80. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992) (quoting Powers v. Ohio,
111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991)).
81. These "remedies" are suggested by Clifford Strider. See Strider, supra note 36.
82. See infra note 83.
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not benefit from this decision. Although the Court arguably decided
McCollum to protect the excluded juror from discrimination, this juror
does not profit from the conclusion reached in this case. 3 However,
state prosecutors are already "handcuffed" by Batson which imposed
the same prohibition against the race-based exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges by the prosecution six years earlier. Thus, McCollum took away
one of a criminal defendant's advantages over the prosecution, improving
the prosecution's situation.
Realistically, each side in a criminal proceeding is after the same
distinct result: a jury which favors its respective side. By eliminating
the unfettered exercise of the peremptory challenge by the defendant,
the Court took away an effective weapon of the defendant that the
prosecution did not possess. Now when selecting a criminal jury, both
sides operate under the same rules.8 This result would obviously be
favored by the prosecution.
Theoretically, the role of a prosecutor encompasses the need to
protect the public and place criminals in jail. Common sense and ex-
perience shows that the voting public mainly views the prosecutor's
effectiveness by his "win/loss" record, and not his genuine desire for
justice, and the electorate judges him accordingly. On the other hand,
common sense also dictates that a criminal defendant, whether guilty
or not, is normally attempting to tally another count in the prosecutor's
"loss" column and clear himself of the charges lodged against him.
These views are diametrically opposed. However, the Court ignores the
adversarial position of the litigants and considers each as state actors.
It is rather difficult to understand how both sides in such mortal conflict
can be considered state actors. The prosecutor is easily classified as a
state actor, but can the defendant be responsible for actions exercised
on behalf of the state? Despite this seeming inconsistency, the Court
places the criminal defendant and prosecutor in the same function as
83. The irony of the situation is that many persons called for jury duty do not want
to serve in the first place. Between employment or simple ambivalence, many seek every
avenue available to avoid this "privilege." Thus, the Court has, in essence, protected the
privilege that many do not want to possess.
One may attempt to contradict the previous irony by analogizing it to the right to
vote and the lack of participation by many persons in the electoral process. Although
the right to vote is protected by the Court, some citizens do not exercise it. However,
a major difference between the two duties is found in the fact that a person is not
summoned to vote, while he is summoned by the state to serve on a jury. Although a
person may choose not to vote, he cannot choose not to answer a summons for jury
duty. Thus, in regards to voting, the Court is protecting a choice not to do something,
rather than protecting a "privilege" that many are mandated to perform. Therefore, the
analogy fails.




exercising state power. s5 Hence, the Court has shifted the balance between
the prosecution and the defendant to allow the individual parties to
compete on an equal level.
4. The State's Broader Interests
Judicial integrity and the elimination of unfair prejudice seem to
be at the core of the Court's decision in McCoilum. When this decision
is taken at first blush, this impression is a valid one. The theme of the
opinion seems to be: "Justice is important, but the ends do not justify
the means. The Court will not recognize convictions if arrived at by
infringing on others' civil rights."
However, while McCollum protects one group's rights, the decision
ignores another important group: those members of pre-McCollum juries.
Implicit in the unconstitutionality of a jury selected through the unfet-
tered use of peremptory challenges is the premise that such a jury will
not allow a trial that is fair to either side. As mentioned previously,
the jury has a truth-finding function in the American judicial scheme.
By stating that a defendant cannot exercise peremptory challenges to
strike a potential juror solely because of his or her race, the implication
is that the jury chosen by the uninhibited exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges is suspect and will not deliver a fair and truthful verdict. This
imposes a stigma on the jurors who are not protected by Batson and
its progeny. Thus, under this view, such a jury cannot, or will not,
fulfill the truth-finding function imposed on it by society.
Finally, the decision in McCollum may represent a type of structural
justice imposed by the Court. The author of the majority opinion,
Justice Blackmun, is normally associated with correcting the "perceptions
of structural harms-the suffering of vulnerable groups from general
patterns of activity.''86 In the eyes of the Court, the excluded potential
jurors are an unprotected and vulnerable group in need of a safe harbor.
The excluded potential jurors are unrepresented by counsel and have
little input into the proceedings in which they are participants. This
situation leaves all jurors (but especially those of racial minorities)
vulnerable. The Court obviously believed that one should not be dis-
qualified for jury duty because of an inherent characteristic . 7 Therefore,
the Court required that justice in the trial on the merits not be gained
at the expense of human dignity.
85. Or does the Court itself exercise state action when it excuses a potential juror
based on a discriminatory peremptory challenge? See discussion of Shelley v. Kraemer,
infra text accompanying notes 104-112.
86. The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 717, 727-28
(1983).
87. "Nonetheless, 'if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel
as fair,' we reaffirm today that such a 'price is too high to meet the standard of the
Constitution."' Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992) (citing Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 112 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991)).
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The exercise of peremptory challenges serves no function outside
the courtroom. Thus, because of the exclusive judicial setting, the Court
determined that the mere implication of state complicity is enough to
justify state action.
However, this exclusivity is not reason enough to impose state action
upon the criminal defendant. Other factors must be taken into consid-
eration. The criminal defendant does not exercise the challenge on the
part of the state, but as an adversary to the state and its representation
by the prosecution. 88 The state, whether acting through a prosecutor,
judge, or legislator, does not aid or encourage the criminal defendant
to the extent necessary to transform the criminal into a state actor. The
argument that a defendant is a state actor and performs a traditional
function of the state simply because he is in a courtroom is circular:
because a defendant is in court, he exercises action on behalf of the
state, and he exercises action on behalf of the state because he is in
court. Thus, the choice to exercise a peremptory challenge against a
potential juror belongs to a criminal defendant, without "such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State."8 9 As Justice O'Connor stated in her
dissent in Edmonson:
A trial ...is by design largely a stage on which private parties
may act; it is a forum through which they can resolve their
disputes in a peaceful and ordered manner. The government
erects the platform; it does not thereby become responsible for
all that occurs upon it. As much as we would like to eliminate
completely from the courtroom the specter of racial discrimi-
nation, the Constitution does not sweep that broadly. 90
This statement exhibits the belief that state action requires some type
of affirmative action on the part of the state. Yet, in Edmonson and
McCollum, the Court makes the state responsible for the defendant's
own personal choices without the state affording any overt aid to that
defendant.
The decision in McCollum marks somewhat of a divergence from
prior Supreme Court precedent. Its basis is found in "the traditional
function of government"; however, this doctrine does not seem appli-
cable here. The following sections will exhibit the possible divergence
in the line of jurisprudence.
88. See discussion of "The State Prosecutor," supra text accompanying notes 83 and
84.
89. Blum v. Yaretzky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 2786 (1982).
90. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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1. Polk County v. Dodson
Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's reasoning in McCollum9'
by referring to a previous decision, Polk County v. Dodson.92 In Dodson,
the Court determined that a public defender was not acting under color
of state law for claims which arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "when
performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant
in a criminal proceeding' '"9 In a later case, the Court held that the
requirement of an actor operating under color of state law for section
1983 purposes is equivalent to the determination employed in the Four-
teenth Amendment's requirement for state action. 94
How can the decision in McCollum square with these prior decisions?
The majority attempts to distinguish Dodson and McCollum on the basis
that Dodson merely stands for the proposition that the adversarial
relationship between the state and the criminal defendant precludes a
determination of state action solely on the basis of the attorney's em-
ployment. 95 However, O'Connor argues that Dodson's "initial holding,
on which the entire opinion turned,' '96 was that the defense of an accused
"is essentially a private function." 97 A criminal defendant and public
defender occupy essentially the same position in the criminal arena. Since
a public defender, according to Dodson, was a private actor when
exercising his duties, a criminal defendant should occupy the same
position and, consequently, is a private actor. Indeed, if anything, the
defendant in McCollum has less of a connection with the state than a
public defender who is paid with state funds. However, this was not
the holding in McCollum.
The premise that a public defender, when performing traditional
defense functions, was not a state actor may be founded on the as-
sumption that a public defender occupies the same position as other
defense attorneys. 9 One could objectively consider the exercise of a
peremptory challenge by a criminal defendant as a traditional defense
function. 99 "[A] private party's exercise of choice allowed by state law
91. McCollum, 112 S. Ct, at 2361-63.
92. 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
93. Id. at 325, 102 S. Ct. at 453. In other words, a criminal defendant may not
maintain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a public defender for legal malpractice. Federal
statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the federal civil rights legislation that addresses grievances
about injuries caused by persons who act "under color of state law."
94. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2749-50
(1982).
95. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
96. Id. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319, 102 S. Ct. 445, 450
(1981)).
98. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 319-25, 102 S. Ct. at 450-54.
99. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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does not amount to state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment so long as 'the initiative comes from [the private party] and not
from the state."' "' ° It is inconsistent that in a criminal case, the Court
considers a criminal defendant and his attorney as state actors when
they privately exercise allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges.
2. Flagg Brothers v. Brooks
The determination of state action in McCollum is also inconsistent
with precedent found in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks. 10 1 Flagg Brothers
involved a New York statute that allowed a warehouseman, after proper
notice, to satisfy any lien on goods stored in his possession by selling
the chattels. Brooks brought this action under the Due Process Clause,
claiming that the action of the warehouseman was attributable to the
state because New York delegated a power to Flagg Brothers that was
traditionally reserved to the state. The United States Supreme Court
held that the action by Flagg Brothers did not constitute state action
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support, Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, reasoned that the "Court . . . has never
held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action converts that
action into that of the State."'0 2
Like the warehouseman's lien in Flagg Brothers, the peremptory
challenge contested in McCollum originates in state law. The plaintiff
in Flagg Brothers argued that the private resolution of disputes is a
traditional function of government. As in the New York statute chal-
lenged in Flagg Brothers, the statutory exercise of peremptory challenges
is limited only by the statute's announcement of "the circumstances
under which [the state] will not interfere."'0 3 There is no "overt and
official involvement" when a criminal-defendant and his counsel exercise
peremptory challenges when selecting a jury, just as there is no involve-
ment of the state when a warehouseman institutes "self-help" pursuant
to state statute.
3. Shelley v. Kraemer
In the action taken in McCollum, the Court imposed an affirmative
duty on the judiciary to investigate and remedy such equal protection
100. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357, 95 S. Ct.
449, 457 (1974)).
101. 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
102. Id. at 164, 98 S. Ct. at 1737.
103. Id. at 166, 98 S. Ct. at 1738.
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violations. The action taken by the Court in McCollum is analogous to
that in Shelley v. Kraemer.1 4
Shelley involved a restrictive covenant against the sale of a parcel
of property to non-whites. The Shelley family, as well as several other
black families, attempted to buy parcels of property burdened with these
restrictive covenants. Members of the neighborhood subsequently sought
an injunction to enforce the discriminatory provisions of the deed. All
parties to the dispute were private persons acting in their private capacity
to enforce a contractual provision. In each case, the state courts upheld
the contractual provisions' validity and dishonored the purchases. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the judgment of the state
courts was reversed on equal protection grounds.105 In the opinion de-
livered by then Chief Justice Vinson, the Court recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful."'0 However, the Court held that
the judicial enforcement of the discriminatory content of the restrictive
covenant that burdened the pieces of property was state action.
The argument espoused in Shelley is analogous to the one faced by
the defendants in McCollum. In the instant litigation, the Court effec-
tively considers that the defendants exercise action on behalf of the state
because of the fact that the events take place in a courtroom. This
construction extends the rationale of Shelley even further. As in Shelley,
the Court in McCollum is placed in the position of enforcing an allegedly
discriminatory action by the private litigants before it, and although the
Court does not cite Shelley as authority in the instant opinion for the
proposition of state action, it seems that the McCollum Court followed
Shelley's logic when it states that "[b]y enforcing a discriminatory per-
emptory challenge, the Court 'has ... elected to place its power, prop-
erty and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination."1 0 7
The logic found in both Shelley and McCollum provides a windfall
to any litigant attempting to prove an Equal Protection Clause violation.
Unfortunately, the Court misses the point. By "focusing analysis on
whether or not there is 'state action,"' Shelley and its progeny would
allow a determination of an equal protection abridgement in most con-
tested cases. 08 If the judicial enforcement of a contractual provision is
104. 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948). Shelley has been regarded as one of the most
controversial and problematic constitutional decisions because of its determination of state
action. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 473 (1962).
105. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 3-6, 68 S. Ct. at 838-39.
106. Id. at 13, 68 S. Ct. at 842.
107. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (1991)).
108. Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 1618 (2d ed., 1991).
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state action, any action taken in a controversy decided in a court of
law would be considered an action on behalf of the state. For example,
this would make judicial enforcement of all wills and testaments that
discriminate against certain parties unconstitutional because the wills
were inoperative without judicial enforcement. Thus, the enforcement
constitutes state action. Once the Court draws the line as it did in
McCollum, there is no conceivable substance to the division between
state and private action.
The rationale discussed previously could signal the end of private
enforcement of actions in the United States judicial system. If the Court
continues to follow the same philosophy as in Shelley and McCollum,
any action that touches on race would be subject to the strictest scrutiny
and would be considered state action. Employment disputes occupy
another area of potential conflict. Title VII of the United States Code
prohibits the termination of employment by a private employer because
of race or sex. 101 However, let us suppose that Title VII did not exist
and that there was no other law prohibiting such discrimination. Fol-
lowing the logic in Shelley and its progeny, it would seem that an
employee fired by a private employer on account of race would have
a constitutional claim. Citing Shelley and McCollum, one would argue
that since the dispute must be enforced by the judicial system, the court
should consider a private employer a state actor. The "power, property
and prestige" 10 of the Court would be placed behind the discrimination
if the Court elected to enforce the termination. As mentioned previously,
United States constitutional law does not apply to private disputes.
However, any decision regarding the discriminatory employer would be
in direct contradiction to Shelley and McCollum. This may reach the
same result as the statutory provision now in effect; however, this
strained interpretation is inconsistent with the theory of the Constitution.
Another rationale behind the decisions in Shelley and McCollum
may be found in the state's permitting such actions. In Shelley, the
Court may have been reacting to the common law's prejudice against
restrictions on the alienation of property."' This attitude, in conjunction
with the racial discrimination, may have triggered the Court's decision." 2
Likewise in McCollum, the Court viewed the criminal defendants' race-
based exercise of peremptory challenges as similar discrimination based
on inherent characteristics, and correspondingly disapproved. The fact
that Georgia's system of justice allows criminal trials to be decided by
109. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
through 2000e-2 (Supp. 1991).
110. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
111. Lawrence Tribe, Constitutional Choices 260 (1985).
112. Id.
19931 1747
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
juries chosen in a discriminatory manner may have been an unmentioned
factor in the Court's decision in McCollum.
4. DeShaney v. Winnebago County D.S.S.
A different approach would be one similar to that taken in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County D.S.S."13 In DeShaney, the Court addressed the
question of whether a parent and child could sue a state department
of social services for not removing the child from a home where he
was subject to repeated abuse by his father. The department had several
notices of the alleged abuse by the father. The child, Joshua DeShaney,
continually exhibited outward signs of such abuse. However, the state
never acted to remove Joshua from this environment. Later, severe
beatings by his father left Joshua gravely injured, and he subsequently
fell into a life-threatening coma. Because of these traumatic injuries
inflicted over a period of time, Joshua was confined to an institution
for the profoundly retarded for the rest of his life. Joshua and his
mother brought an action against the state department of social services,
claiming that by its inaction, the state was liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 due to its violation of the Due Process Clause." 4
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that
Joshua DeShaney and his mother could not recover because their claim
did not manifest some action fairly attributable to the state or local
government. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "[t]he Clause is
phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act" and "cannot fairly
be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure
that those interests do not come to harm through other means."" 5
Although McCollum and DeShaney address different constitutional
provisions-the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause-the
criteria for determining state action are the same for both clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 However, the Court's conclusions as to
the existence of state action are in absolute contradiction. If the standard
for state action employed in Shelley and McCollum was applied in
DeShaney, the Court would be forced to find an affirmative duty owed
by the department of social services. However, in the present litigation,
the Court did not apply the DeShaney standard. As Chief Justice Rehn-
quist opined, the duty imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment is not
an affirmative duty on the State, but a limitation on the government's
power. However, in McCollum, the Court takes upon itself to intervene
in the relationship between two arguably private parties, the criminal
113. 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
114. Id. at 191-93, 109 S. Ct. at 1001-2.
115. Id. at 195, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
116. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
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defendant and the potential juror. Granted, the facts in McCollum seem
to reach out for remedy; however, they are no more compelling than
those facts which surround the plight of "Poor Joshua!"'1 7 Both results
should be the same.
Issues involving race are very sensitive and require strict scrutiny
when analyzed for constitutional purposes. However, this scrutiny should
apply to only the substantive issue (equal protection challenge), not the
vehicle (state action) to access the issue. In a strict scrutiny analysis, a
state regulation will only be upheld if it is "necessary to the accom-
plishment of a permissible state objective.""' Very few state actions
regarding race are upheld under strict scrutiny." 9 If this substantive
analytical tool is applied to the state action questions in all cases claiming
racial discrimination, it is most likely that the Court will make a state
action determination against the discriminating party, thus making it a
constitutional question. Consequently, for example, if an owner of a
major league baseball team were to refuse to allow African-Americans
to play in his stadium, notwithstanding any other clause of the United
States Constitution, this action would constitute "state action" and,
thus, be governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The application of
strict scrutiny to state action determinations arguably would result in
the "constitutionalization" of most, if not all, private actions. Although
racial discrimination in the private arena is despicable, it does not rise
to a constitutional question, and other remedies exist to correct it.120
In McCollum, no affirmative duty on the part of the trial court
exists to forbid the race-based exercise of peremptory challenges on the
part of the defense. The trial court in McCollum is analogous to the
department of social services in DeShaney: both are passive by-standers
with no active participation in the injury. Thus, if the Court had exercised
the restraint in McCollum that it did in DeShaney, it never would have
reached the substantive issue of race-based exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges and would have avoided confusion. Thus, in order to maintain
a consistent approach to the analysis of state action, the Court should
adopt the restraint exercised in DeShaney. Only when this threshold is
crossed should the Court apply the stricter scrutiny to evaluate the
alleged discriminatory claim in question.
These two cases may be reconciled by the premise that the Court
was willing to subject the state to responsibility for courtroom proce-
dures, but not monetary damages. However, although this rationale may
117. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213, 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967).
119. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944), is generally
considered to be the last case to uphold a race-related statute under the strict scrutiny
analysis. Stone et al., supra note 108, at 572.
120. Other remedies such as breach of contract, injunction, and specific performance
are sufficient to remedy such situations.
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be the reason behind the two different interpretations, this would not
seem to be good constitutional law. The attorneys and judiciary of the
United States need to have a consistent "map" of constitutional litigation
to effectively represent future clients. This seeming inconsistency makes
it difficult (if not impossible) for members of the bar to accurately
perform in their representative capacities. It now becomes a "guessing
game" to determine which liberty the Court will value more. The Court
should treat similar claims brought under the same Constitutional pro-
vision by the same standards.
As exhibited previously, the equal protection analysis has undergone
a rather extensive transformation from the holding in the late nineteenth
century in Swain to the decision in Edmonson over one hundred years
later. In McCollum, however, the Court has gone a step too far in its
attempt to eliminate racial discrimination. The Court in Edmonson and
McCollum converts a defendant's exercise of his peremptory challenge
for some purposes into an exercise of challenges for cause. 12' The ex-
tension of the doctrine announced in Edmonson to private civil litigation
is questionable enough. However, it appears the Court has taken con-
stitutional interpretation to the extremes of reasonable analysis when
"[a] criminal defendant, in the process of defending himself against the
state, is held to be acting on behalf of the state."' 22
IV. BEYOND RACE: APPLICATION OF MCCOLLUM TO GENDER
[Slince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable char-
acteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the im-
position of special disabilities upon the members of a particular
sex because of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility .... "123
This statement by Justice William Brennan places gender on an
equal footing with race as a suspect class for constitutional equal pro-
tection purposes. However, this is not the case in practice. The pro-
portion of cases struck down for gender discrimination is much lower
than those struck down because of challenges based upon race. 24 In his
concurrence to McCollum, Justice Thomas warns that, by prohibiting
121. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 149-162.
122. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2364 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1770 (1973) (quoting
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1407 (1972)).
However, this statement was never fully realized. The Court has never granted full
"suspect" class status to gender discrimination.'Frontiero is the "high-water" mark in
this area of constitutional jurisprudence.
124. Chase & Ducat, supra note 63.
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the race-based exercise of peremptory challenges, the Court opens the
door to constitutional questions regarding the exercise of gender-based
exclusions from jury service. t2 This section of the note will focus on
the fulfillment of this admonition and the applicability of McCollum
regarding the exercise of peremptory challenges based solely upon the
potential jurors' gender.
A. Historical Context
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was
a post-Civil War amendment enacted to remedy the unequal treatment
of the newly-freed slaves.126 Although the Equal Protection Clause em-
ploys the word "persons"-implying protection for both men and women,
black and white, and citizen and alien-only one uneventful portion of
the Congressional debate concerning the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment was devoted to whether women were entitled to the pro-
tection afforded by this piece of legislation. 27 This premise was soon
tested in Bradwell v. Illinois.128
Bradwell was the first constitutional challenge to the different treat-
ment of the sexes.129 It involved the refusal of an application of admission
to the Illinois bar to the female plaintiff, and the bar premised its
decision solely on her status as a woman. The United States Supreme
Court held that this action did not violate the Privileges or Immunities
Clause expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing in concurrence
to the judgment, Justice Bradley expressed the "paternalistic attitude"
prevalent during this time period: "Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender .... The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator." 1 30
These views of the Court concerning the differences between the
sexes took many decades to change. It was not until 1971 that the Court
disallowed, as violating the Fourteenth Amendment, the arbitrary dis-
tinctions between the sexes used as the sole reason for the mandatory
preference of one sex over another. Reed v. Reed'3 ' marked the first
time that the Court exhibited a "special sensitivity to sex as a classifying
125. "Next will come the question whether defendants may exercise peremptories on
the basis of sex." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
126. Berger, supra note 24, at 18.
127. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866). See also John Harrison, Re-
constructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1460 and n.282
(1992).
128. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
129. Rebecca Korzec, Justice Brennan's Gender Jurisprudence, Court Review, Volume
29, Number 3 (Fall 1992).
130. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
131. 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
19931
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
factor."' 32 However, the justices still addressed gender by applying a
rational relationship test rather than employing a strict scrutiny review,
as it does when suspect classes such as race are concerned.'33 Today,
the Court treats gender as a quasi-suspect class and applies an inter-
mediate standard of review which is below that given to race but above
that afforded to economic provisions.'34
In 1976, the Court applied a heightened scrutiny standard to gender
classifications in Craig v. Boren.'35 The issue in Craig involved an
Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.207o alcohol beer to
males under twenty-one years of age, while only prohibiting it to females
under the age of eighteen. In this instance, Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, espoused heightened scrutiny. In order "[t]o withstand con-
stitutional challenge .. .classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives."'' 36 This marked the first time that a majority
of the Court had applied anything but a rational relationship test to
an equal protection challenge to determine the constitutionality of a
gender-based classification.
B. Recent Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally addressed the
validity of exclusions from jury service because of gender on Sixth
Amendment grounds rather than in equal protection challenges. In Taylor
v. Louisiana,'37 the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute excluding women
from jury service unless a written declaration of intent or waiver of
exemption was filed with the court signifying amenability to that duty.
The Court ruled that this statute was a violation of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of a fair and impartial trial because the exclusion of fifty-
three percent of the population infringed on the requirement that a jury
panel be drawn from a fair cross-section of a community.'
132. Korzec, supra note 129, at 8 (quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term Foreward: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1972)).
133. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76, 92 S. Ct. at 253-54.
134. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 197, 97 S. Ct. at 457.
137. 419 U.S. 522, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975).
138. The defendant in Taylor was indicted by a St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, grand
jury for aggravated kidnapping. A petit jury venire of one hundred seventy-five people
was drawn for the term in which the trial court would hear Taylor's proceedings. Of
this number, no females were chosen for possible jury service because of operation of
the Louisiana statute, The defendant filed a motion to quash the venire because of this
discrepancy, but was denied. After conviction and sentencing to the death penalty, Taylor
appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court challenging the validity of the verdict. The
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The holding in Taylor does not apply to the selection of the jury
panel itself. Thus it offers little help in the selection of a particular
jury like that at issue in McCollum, and it provides no guidance as to
the gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges and the selection of
particular juries. To date the Supreme Court has not addressed the
constitutionality of the gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges; 3 9
however, examples of how the lower appellate courts treat the issue can
be instructive. Of these courts, the Ninth and Fourth circuits are examples
of the two different analyses applied by the lower federal courts.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the gender-based
exercise of peremptory challenges in United States v. De Gross.'40 In
De Gross, the defendant was charged with three counts of aiding and
abetting the transportation of an alien within the United States. During
voir dire, the female defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to
exclude seven males from the jury. Subsequent to the seventh strike,
the prosecution objected to the exclusion of the male venirepersons.
After the prosecution made a prima facie case of discrimination, De
Gross offered no explanation to justify her challenges. Thus, the seventh
venireperson struck was seated on the jury. An impaneled jury consisting
of three men and nine women convicted the defendant of the crimes
charged. De Gross appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, where the court upheld the equal protection challenge
and prohibited the gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges.' 4'
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that an exclusion from jury service on
the basis of gender harms the excluded venirepersons, weakens public
confidence in the judicial system, and engenders community prejudice.
The gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges are violative of the
Equal Protection Clause for the same justifications as those exercises
of peremptory challenges prohibited by Batson.142
Louisiana high court affirmed the trial court's decision. Noting probable jurisdiction, 415
U.S. 911, 94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974), the United States Supreme Court agreed to review the
litigation. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 524-25, 95 S. Ct. at 694-95.
139. However, prior to publication, the United States Supreme Court granted writ of
certiorari in J.E.B. v. State of Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992), to consider this very question. J.E.B. v. T.B., cert. granted, 1993 WL 22851 (May
12, 1993). Thus, the Supreme Court will soon provide guidance on this important question.
The following analysis will consider the current jurisprudence on the subject and supply
a possible path of interpretation for the Court.
140. 913 F.2d 1417 (1990), reh'g granted, 930 F.2d 695 (1991), 960 F.2d 1433 (en
banc) (9th Cir. 1992).
141. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1435-36 (en banc).
142. The action against De Gross was brought in federal court; thus, it was a federally-
impaneled jury that convicted him of the charges. The court applied equal protection
principles found in the Fifth Amendment that are incorporated in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason, the principles that compelled the
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The decision in United States v. Hamilton43 is in stark contrast to
the decision in De Gross. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the decision in Batson did not prohibit the exercise of peremptory
challenge solely on the basis of gender.
The defendants in Hamilton were indicted for various drug-related
offenses. Each of the eight defendants was African-American. The gov-
ernment used seven of its eight peremptory strikes to exclude African-
Americans from the jury. The district court denied the motions for
mistrial, stating that the defense did not show a systematic exclusion
required by Swain v. Alabama. While this case was on appeal, the
Court decided Batson, relaxing the requirement for the challenging party.
The case was remanded to the district court where the court found the
government's racially neutral explanations satisfactory. 14
The jury that ultimately convicted the defendants consisted of nine
female and three male members. Of the eight peremptory strikes by the
prosecution three were made against females. The explanation given by
the prosecution was that "it wanted to take steps to insure that a jury
would not be overly sympathetic to the female defendants."' 4 The court
of appeals found the racially-neutral explanation required by Batson
given by the prosecution acceptable. However the court rejected the
defendants' claim that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the gender-
based exercise of peremptory challenges. It reasoned that "if the Supreme
Court in Batson had desired, it could have abolished the peremptory
challenge or prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the basis of
race, gender, age or other group classification.'4 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit found no basis in Supreme Court jurisprudence to prohibit the
exercise of peremptory challenges solely because of race.
C. Application of Batson to Gender-Based Exclusions
Even under the heightened scrutiny standard discussed previously in
Craig, the gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges should be
unconstitutional in light of the decisions following Batson, especially
Edmonson and McCollum. Assuming state action is present, the litigants'
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges implicates the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus the only question remaining is whether exclusion
from a jury panel solely because of gender bears a substantial relation
to an important government objective.
Court's prohibition on racially-motivated exercises of peremptory challenges in Batson are
applicable here.
143. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069, 110 S. Ct. 1109
(1990).
144. Id. at 1039-40.
145. Id. at 1041.
146. Id. at 1042.
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It would appear that the approach followed by the Ninth Circuit
in De Gross is the proper avenue for the Court to take on this issue.
A litigant can no more formulate a legitimate state purpose for such
an exercise of a peremptory challenge than can a party that excludes
an African-American venireperson solely because of the color of his
skin. 47 As in the exercise of race-based exclusions, a woman possesses
no inherent infirmities that would preclude her from jury service solely
because of her gender. An attorney can no more rely on the assumption
that a woman (being the traditionally more compassionate gender) would
be more sensitive to a plaintiff than it can rely on the assumption that
an African-American would tend to favor an African-American litigant
simply because of their similar heritage. If this action is not acceptable
when exercised because of race, it should not be acceptable when it is
motivated by gender. Because this exclusion based on gender does not
relate to a substantial state interest, in light of the Court's decision in
McCollum, the gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges should
likewise be held unconstitutional. If the Court plans to continue the use
of peremptory challenges to select juries, it must extend the same pro-
tection afforded race to gender and disallow the gender-based exercise
of peremptory challenges.14'
V. FUTURE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Batson and its progeny call into question the entire future of per-
emptory challenges. Placing such restrictions as those contemplated and
enacted in the decisions discussed previously on criminal and civil litigants
arguably dilutes the usefulness and effectiveness of the exercise of per-
emptory challenges. This is a severe limitation which could possibly lead
to the demise of the practice of exercising this important right of the
litigant.
A peremptory challenge is, by its nature, intended to be exercised
without reason and subject to no external control. 49 However, by its
decisions in Batson and subsequent jurisprudence, the Court imposes
severe restrictions on these ad hoc decisions of future litigants. These
restrictions on the exercise of peremptory challenges in all actuality result
in a "watered-down" version of the challenge for cause. This equal
protection analysis imposed on the litigant's exercise of a peremptory
challenge entails "a radical change in the nature and operation of the
147. See, e.g., Jo, supra note 14.
148. This same rationale could be applied to any groups that are not already protected
under Batson and its progeny. These include age, religion, wealth, alienage, handicap,
birth station, and sexual preference.
149. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220, 85 S. Ct. 824, 836 (1965) (per White,
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challenge."' 10 This change has engendered some to call for the abolition
of the peremptory challenge.' 5 '
One who has called for the elimination of peremptory challenges is
former Justice Thurgood Marshall. In his concurrence in Batson, Mar-
shall viewed the only way to remove discrimination from the exercise
of peremptory challenges as the abolition of the whole system. 52 He
believed the standard fashioned by the majority did not go far enough
to end discrimination in the courtroom because, in his view, this test
allowed the prosecution to discriminate as long as it held "that dis-
crimination to an 'acceptable' level."' 53 Another reason for his com-
punction in the Court's remedy in Batson concerned the burden placed
on the trial court to assess the hidden reasons behind the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges. The very nature of the "arbitrary
and capricious right' ' 54 afforded to litigants by the peremptory challenge
makes this motivation almost impossible to ascertain. Any well-trained
and well-prepared attorney should be able to give neutral explanations
for the exercise of a challenge when confronted with a claim of dis-
crimination. Reasons such as the venireperson was uncommunicative'"
or the juror has a son the same age as defendant'5 6 have been found
as acceptable neutral explanations. If all an attorney must do is com-
municate such nebulous reasons to justify his peremptory strikes, "the
protection erected by the Court [in Batson] ...may be illusory."' 57
The Batson requirements also may cause great difficulty in the ability
of an attorney to examine a potential juror during voir dire. In some
instances, an attorney finds a potential juror unacceptable for reasons
he just cannot articulate. Once counsel exercises an initial peremptory
against an African-American, according to Batson and its progeny, he
can no longer utilize this "hunch" or "seat-of-the-pants" judgment
when examining an African-American. Suddenly, the attorney can no
longer rely upon his inarticulable reason and must devise some race-
neutral grounds for the strike. It is not enough for the attorney to say,
150. Id. at 221-22, 85 S. Ct. at 836-37.
151. See, e.g., Brent J. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Trial, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 227 (1986); Jonathan B. Mintz, Comment,
Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and
Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 1026 (1987).
152. 476 U.S. 79, 105-07, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1727-28 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 105, 106 S. Ct. at 1728.
154. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S. Ct. 824, 835 (1965) (quoting Lewis
v. United States, 146 U.S.. 370, 378, 13 S. Ct. 136, 139 (1892)).
155. King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 498-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
156. People v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854, 856 (1983).




"I have a feeling that the potential juror is against my client." Without
this option, the attorney must enter a prolonged and intensive exami-
nation of the potential juror, thereby possibly alienating him from
objectively considering both sides of the controversy. In this situation,
the realities of jury selection prevent the use of a challenge for cause
because the potential juror exhibits no external partiality, but may
subconsciously harbor ill feelings against the examining attorney.
The Court has never ruled that the peremptory challenge is guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution. 5 8 However, federal jurispru-
dence recognizes the practice of examination of potential jurors by use
of peremptory challenges as an essential component of a fair trial by
jury.' 9 By limiting the function of peremptories in such a severe way,
the Court may have sounded a deathknell for the peremptory challenge.
Even Justice White when writing for the majority in Swain recognized
that to subject individual peremptory challenges to the standards of
equal protection would dramatically alter the challenge's function.w Once
equal protection scrutiny is applied, it will be difficult for the disputed
challenge to survive even a rational review, much less heightened or
strict scrutiny. The next cognizable group considered for protection will
be gender, then religion, and then possibly applied to other identifiable
groups in society. Where should the line be drawn?
After Batson, Edmonson, and McCollum, the exercise of peremptory
challenges has been markedly undermined. The purpose expressed in
these cases-the elimination of discrimination in the judicial process-
is noble indeed. The integrity of the court and judicial system are
important justifications. However, under the strictures imposed by the
Court, peremptory challenges have outlived their usefulness. No longer
are attorneys free to act on instincts. Now, in at least situations involving
race, advocates must formulate reasons for such strikes. However, as
the previous discussion concerning gender shows, the Court faces a
difficult task to limit these situations just to the exclusion on account
of race. The number of situations where neutral reasons are required
will only increase with time. Once the Court protects these groups, it
will have to protect everyone unless it is ready to assert that the Equal
Protection Clause only addresses issues concerning race and gender.
Short of overruling Supreme Court jurisprudence, the only remedy
for these concerns is found in legislative or jurisprudential action to
eliminate peremptory challenges in the courtroom. As stated previously,
discrimination in the courtroom based solely upon race and gender should
be eliminated. However, to remedy this discrimination by diluting an
158. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S. Ct. at 835.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 221-22, 85 S. Ct. at 836-37.
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essential trial technique such as peremptory challenges is unacceptable.
The exercise of a peremptory challenge offers uses other than eliminating
potential jurors on account of race or gender. This practice helps assure
a party a fair trial as it helps to eliminate those potential jurors that
may have pre-determined the guilt or innocence of the defendant. How-
ever, in some cases, the examining attorney simply cannot articulate his
reasons for dismissal. In light of Batson and its progeny, the peremptory
challenge system cannot survive handcuffed to reasoned inquiry. Al-
though a peremptory challenge is "one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused,"'16' "it must be exercised with full freedom,
or it fails of its full purpose."' 162 These new restrictions impose limits
which severely impinge this "full freedom." For this reason, in light
of McCollum and its predecessors, peremptory challenges do not serve
their traditional and intended purpose, and should be eliminated.
J. Christopher Peters
161. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408, 14 S. Ct. 410, 414 (1894).
162. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S. Ct. 136, 139 (1892).
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